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NOTES
Corporate Law-CORPORATIONS MAY EXCLUDE RAIDERS FROM
DEFENSIVE SELF-TENDER OFFERS IN WARDING OFF HOSTILE
TAKEOVERS-Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946
(Del. 1985)
I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate takeovers have increased significantly in the last de-
cade, subjecting many companies to hostile tender offers. In re-
sponse, incumbent managements have devised a variety of de-
fenses to fend off these unwelcome offers. Delineating the proper
role of management faced with a hostile tender offer is a difficult
task. While management should have the discretion to protect the
corporation from raiders that intend to injure shareholders by in-
ducing them to accept inadequate tender offers, officers should not
be allowed to reject lucrative offers in an attempt to entrench
themselves in office, contrary to the shareholders' best interests. In
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,' the Delaware Supreme
Court established the scope of judicial review for management ac-
tion opposing a takeover.
One means by which incumbent management can oppose a hos-
tile takeover attempt is by purchasing the company's shares on the
market, thereby precluding acquisition of those shares by the con-
trol-seeking group or company. In Unocal, the defensive tactic at
issue was such a self-tender by Unocal, which excluded the hostile
tender offeror, Mesa, from tendering its shares of Unocal stock.
Mesa challenged the discriminatory tender offer in the Delaware
Court of Chancery. Unocal defended by asserting the Business
Judgment Rule,2 through which courts generally refuse to subject
managers' decisions to review on the merits.3 However, the court
held that the rule did not apply to a selective purchase of the com-
pany's stock and issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting
1. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
2. The Business Judgment Rule provides that "absent bad faith or some other corrupt
motive, directors are not normally liable for mistakes of judgment, whether those mistakes
are classified as mistakes of fact or mistakes of law." Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp.,
582 F.2d 259, 274 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979).
3. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to
a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1161, 1195 (1981).
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Unocal from proceeding with the tender offer unless Mesa could
tender its shares on the same terms as other shareholders." On ap-
peal, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed the issue: "Did the
Unocal board have the power and duty to oppose a takeover threat
it reasonably perceived to be harmful to the corporate enterprise,
and if so, [was] its action . . . entitled to the protection of the bus-
iness judgment rule?"'
In this Note, the author reviews Delaware cases delineating the
role of corporate management facing a takeover attempt, analyzes
the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., discusses possible ramifications for future takeover
attempts, and examines the federal court action filed by Mesa as
well as the Securities and Exchange Commission's response.
II. THE ROLE OF INCUMBENT MANAGEMENT FACED WITH A
TAKEOVER
Delaware courts have applied various standards of judicial re-
view to corporate board action in hostile takeover situations, in-
cluding the corporate interest standard, the fairness standard, and
the Business Judgment Rule. Additionally, some academicians ad-
vocate court-imposed managerial passivity in the takeover context;
others contend that while management should be able to respond
to tender offers, that response should be limited by requiring
board actions to be subject to close judicial scrutiny.
A. Delaware Case Law
In Bennett v. Propp,6 the corporate Chairman purchased a sub-
stantial number of company shares on the open market after learn-
ing that another company intended to acquire a majority of the
company's stock. It was unclear initially whether the Chairman's
purchases were made on his own behalf or on behalf of the corpo-
ration.7 Shareholders brought a derivative suit against the Board
of Directors, alleging that corporate assets were wasted in order to
retain managerial control.8 Because the Chairman's purchases were
4. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 951. The temporary restraining order was changed to a prelimi-
nary injunction by the Vice Chancellor after the interlocutory appeal was granted. The Del-
aware Supreme Court allowed the Vice Chancellor to proceed with a hearing to enlarge the
record on various issues. Id. at 952.
5. Id. at 953.
6. 187 A.2d 405 (Del. 1962).
7. Id. at 407
8. Id. at 408.
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later ratified by the Board, the lower court determined that the
purchases were made in the corporation's behalf.9 The Delaware
Supreme Court upheld the Court of Chancery's finding that the
purchases were made in order to preserve incumbent manage-
ment's control and found such use of corporate funds improper10
because the Board had failed to identify an immediate threat to
the corporation or any genuine business reason for the purchase."
The Delaware Supreme Court noted that incumbent manage-
ment might use corporate funds to preserve its control, and recog-
nized that "directors are of necessity confronted with a conflict of
interest and an objective decision is difficult." 2 Thus, directors us-
ing corporate funds to combat threats to corporate policy must
"justify such a purchase as one primarily in the corporate inter-
est."'13 Applying this standard, the court held both the Chairman
and the President of the corporation liable for the improper
purchases made for the purpose of perpetuating their control. The
President was held liable because he knew of the Chairman's
purchases but did nothing to remedy the situation." The other Di-
rectors were not held liable because their ratification of the
purchases was aimed at protecting the corporation from potential
litigation.1"
Cheff v. Mathes16 was the next major Delaware case to delineate
management's proper role when facing a takeover. In Chef[, a
known corporate raider purchased a large block of the target com-
pany's stock, creating employee unrest at the prospect of company
9. Id. at 407. The timing of the ratification ran counter to the court's finding that the
purchases were made on behalf of the corporation. Having a board adopt a ratification reso-
lution prior to the purchases would be a better procedure for demonstrating that they were
made on behalf of the corporation.
10. Id. at 408. In Yasik v. Wachtel, 17 A.2d 309 (Del. Ch. 1941), the court approved the
general principle that directors cannot use their powers to preserve their control of the
corporation.
11. Bennett, 187 A.2d at 409. The absence of a valid business purpose distinguished the
Chairman's purchases from those made by Directors in Kors v. Carey, 158 A.2d 136 (Del.
Ch. 1960). In Kors, the Directors repurchased the corporation's shares from a company at-
tempting to change the target corporation's established method of selling cosmetics.
12. Bennett, 187 A.2d at 409.
13. Id.
14. Id. The court examined the following factors in holding the President, along with the
Chairman, jointly and severally liable: "his knowledge of the purchases, his silence and fail-
ure to act, coupled with his vote on the resolution." Id.
15. Id. However, the court made clear that directors would be exonerated from liability
only when there was an immediate emergency, of which the directors previously had been
unaware. Id.
16. 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
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liquidation.1 7 In response, the target company's Board adopted a
resolution to repurchase the stock from the raider at a price above
that of the prevailing market,1 8 a practice commonly known as
"greenmail."' 9
Shareholders brought a derivative suit against the Board, alleg-
ing that it had purchased stock for the purpose of retaining its
control. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the lower court's
decision, which had held four Directors liable on that ground.20
The supreme court cited Bennett, which placed the initial burden
upon directors to justify a repurchase of shares "as one primarily
in the corporate interest,"" but noted that directors who lacked
personal pecuniary interests did not have the "same 'self-dealing
interest' as is present . ..when a director sells property to the
corporation."22 Thus, the fairness standard 2 -which requires that
all board actions be fair to corporate shareholders-while appro-
priate when directors have personal pecuniary interests, was held
inapplicable.2 4
The supreme court, without labeling it as such, applied the Busi-
ness Judgment Rule in analyzing the repurchase of shares. Under
this rule, directors must satisfy their burden of demonstrating rea-
sonable grounds to believe a danger to the corporation existed by
showing that they acted in good faith, after reasonable investiga-
tion of the tender offer. Thus, they "will not be penalized for an
honest mistake in judgment, if the judgment appeared reasonable
at the time the decision was made. ' 25 The Cheff court determined
that the Business Judgment Rule was satisfied because the Board
conducted an investigation of the threat, received professional ad-
vice, and determined that the actions of the raider were inconsis-
17. Id. at 551-52. The incumbent Directors refused the raider's demand to be placed on
the Board. The raider also opposed the company's retail sales organization, believing it to be
obsolete. Id. at 552.
18. Id. at 553.
19. Id. The Delaware Supreme Court described the practice of "greenmail" as "buying
out a takeover bidder's stock at a premium that is not available to other stockholders in
order to prevent the takeover." Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 n.13
(Del. 1985).
20. Cheff, 199 A.2d at 553.
21. Id. at 554.
22. Id.
23. The fairness standard would require a court to "review [the action] and subject it to
rigid and careful scrutiny, and would invalidate [the action] if it was found to be unfair to
the corporation." Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?, 22 Bus. LAW 35, 43 (1966).
24. Cheff, 199 A.2d at 554; see Smith v. Good Music Station, Inc., 129 A.2d 242 (Del. Ch.
1957).
25. Cheff, 199 A.2d at 555.
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tent with its purported corporate purpose. Further, the Directors
were entitled to use their personal funds to oppose the raider, once
they made a good faith decision serving corporate interests. The
court held that the Board's method of financing stock repurchases
was a matter of business judgment.2"
In Pogostin v. Rice,27 the Delaware Supreme Court again applied
the Business Judgment Rule to the Directors' rejection of a tender
offer. The issue was whether shareholders could sue the Board of
Directors without first demanding that the Board bring suit
against themselves for wrongful refusal to negotiate with the cor-
porate raider. The shareholders alleged that the defendant Direc-
tors improperly refused a tender offer solely because they wished
to retain corporate control. The shareholders argued that the
Board's refusal to negotiate or accept the raider's tender offer,
which included a premium over market price, was a prima facie
breach of fiduciary duty.2"
The court recognized that "the availability, function, and opera-
tion of the business judgment rule" is applicable in the takeover
context.2 "9 Thus, the shareholders had to show that the sole or pri-
mary motive for rejecting the tender offer was improper. The court
found that the shareholders had failed to plead facts supporting
their claim, and it rejected the argument that the Board's desire to
retain control was shown by the mere fact that it opposed the
tender offer. If refusal of an offer or failure to negotiate proved a
prima facie breach of a fiduciary duty then corporate boards would
be robbed "of all discretion, forcing them to choose between ac-
cepting any tender offer or merger proposal above market, or fac-
ing the likelihood of personal liability if they reject it."' 0
Giving target company management the opportunity to oppose
inadequate tender offers without fear of being held personally lia-
ble should not be judicially discouraged because directors are privy
to information vital to an informed evaluation of tender offers. Di-
rectors can disclose this information to shareholders and allow
them to decide whether they should tender. However, courts
26. Id. at 556.
27. 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984).
28. Id. at 622.
29. Id. at 627. The court cited a number of cases in reaching this conclusion, including
two federal appeals court decisions applying Delaware law. See Panter v. Marshall Field &
Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629
F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
30. Pogostin, 480 A.2d at 627.
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should not afford directors absolute freedom to reject lucrative
tender offers in order to entrench themselves in office.
B. Other Alternatives
Several commentators have argued that target company direc-
tors should play a limited role in dealing with hostile tender of-
fers31 because there is an inherent conflict of interest between in-
cumbent management and shareholders.3 2 The conflict exists
because current management probably will be ousted when the
corporate raider takes control. This is especially apparent when
management has a "substantial interest in the control of the corpo-
ration extending beyond the directorship itself."'33
Gelfond and Sebastian criticize the motive-based primary pur-
pose judicial standard, which was applied in Cheff and Bennett, as
"difficult to apply, . . . and generally ill-suited to the hostile
tender offer situation."3" Under this standard, courts are to deter-
mine whether directors took action for the primary purpose of
maintaining control3 5 or whether their actions were taken primarily
in the corporate interest.3 6 One difficulty in utilizing this test lies
in defining "primary" and applying that definition to a corporate
board's collective action. 7 However, the main problem is that the
primary purpose test is subjective; thus, it may be difficult to prove
that the board's primary purpose in acting was to maintain its con-
trol. Gelfond and Sebastian note that by using clever tactics,
"management will. . . color its actions as being in the best inter-
ests of the shareholders,"3 8 thereby insulating itself from judicial
review.
31. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 3; Gelfond & Sebastian, Reevaluating the Duties
of Target Management in a Hostile Tender Offer, 60 B.U.L. REv. 403 (1980); Gilson, A
Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Of-
fers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981).
32. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 3, at 1198; Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note 31, at
436; Gilson, supra note 31, at 825.
33. Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note 31, at 436.
34. Id. at 437.
35. Id. at 415.
36. Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962).
37. Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note 31, at 438. It is unclear whether "primary" means a
motive stronger than any other individual motive or whether it refers to a motive stronger
than all other motives, collectively. Difficulties also arise in ascertaining primary purpose
when directors have acted collectively. It is not clear whether a court should look to the
motive of the board as a collective entity, or whether primary purpose is derived from a sum
of the directors' individual motives. Id.
38. Id. at 415-16.
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The application of the Business Judgment Rule also has been
criticized as inappropriate in the takeover context.39 Professor Gil-
son aptly states that "the business judgment rule does not express
the measure by which a court determines whether management has
discharged its duty of care; rather its application reflects a conclu-
sion that the management action in question will not be reviewed
at all."40 Courts traditionally have not applied the Business Judg-
ment Rule to cases in which directors have conflicts of interest."'
However, in the takeover context, courts have found that directors
do not have conflicts of interest' 2 and have held the Business Judg-
ment Rule applicable to management action. In effect, this means
that board actions will not be judicially scrutinized unless fraud or
gross overreaching is shown. Gelfond and Sebastian note that such
a deferential approach seems inappropriate, given that manage-
ment may act in order to maintain its control.' 3
Professor Gilson contends that management should play a com-
pletely passive role when faced with a tender offer, because the
shareholders should ultimately decide whether to accept the offer.
Gilson's approach focuses on whether management acted, and on
the type of action taken, not on the wisdom or good faith behind
the particular action.""
Gelfond and Sebastian maintain that self-serving managerial ac-
tion could be thwarted by subjecting that action to a fairness test
by which courts would consider objective factors, case by case, to
determine whether management acted fairly toward shareholders. 5
This test should be easier to apply than the primary purpose doc-
39. Id. at 436-37; Gilson, supra note 31, at 822.
40. Gilson, supra note 31, at 822.
41. Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note 31, at 435-36.
42. Id. at 434.
43. Id. at 435.
44. Gilson proposed the following rule to govern the role of management in responding
to a tender offer:
During the period commencing with the date on which target management has
reason to believe that a tender offer may be made for part or all of a target com-
pany's equity securities and ending at such time thereafter that the offeror shall
have had a reasonable period in which to present the offer to target shareholders,
no action shall be taken by the target company which could interfere with the
success of the offer or result in the shareholders of the target company being de-
nied the opportunity to tender their shares except that the target company (1)
may disclose to the public or its shareholders information bearing on the value or
the attractiveness of the offer, and (2) may seek out alternative transactions which
it believes may be more favorable to target shareholders.
Gilson, supra note 31, at 878-79.
45. See Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note 31, at 470-72.
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trine and would provide shareholders assurance that management
was not acting primarily out of self-interest in rejecting tender
offers.
One case in which a higher scope of judicial review was applied
to incumbent management action is Klaus v. Hi-Shear Co.4" In
Klaus, the court of appeals interpreted California law to require a
"compelling business purpose" to justify management action which
perpetuated incumbent control. 7 The court noted that the term
" 'compelling business purpose' suggests a balancing of the good to
the corporation against the disproportionate advantage to the ma-
jority shareholders and incumbent management." '48 This standard
is attractive because it would permit incumbent management to
reject hostile tender offers for "compelling business purposes," yet
deter management from acting primarily to retain its control.
However, this standard does not placate critics who contend that
management should play a completely passive role when facing a
tender offer.
III. THE DELAWARE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN Unocal Corp.
v. Mesa Petroleum Co.
In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court applied the Business
Judgment Rule in analyzing Unocal's response to Mesa's hostile
tender offer, but the court introduced a balancing test requiring
corporate boards to weigh various objective factors before acting
on a tender offer. This balancing test provides an avenue for judi-
cial scrutiny which may help ensure that corporate boards act pri-
marily in the corporate interest. However, this check may not be
stringent enough. Other court-imposed standards, such as the fair-
ness test or the requirement of total management passivity, may be
necessary to ensure that tender offers are handled for shareholders'
best interests.
A. The Court's Analysis in Unocal
Unocal's discriminatory tender offer was adopted in response to
a tender offer by T. Boone Pickens, Jr., and the Mesa group. 9
46. 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975).
47. Id. at 233-34. The court rejected the defendants' argument that their actions were
protected by the Business Judgment Rule.
48. Id. at 234.
49. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949. The members of the Mesa group included Mesa Petroleum
Co., Mesa Asset Co., Mesa Partners II, and Mesa Eastern, Inc.
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Mesa acquired approximately 13 % of Unocal's stock before it com-
menced a two-tiered "front loaded" cash tender offer for approxi-
mately 37% of Unocal's outstanding stock. The price offered to
stockholders tendering at the "front end" was $54 in cash. Those
tendering at the "back end" would exchange their shares for secur-
ities purportedly worth $54. 50 This second-tier offer was designed
to eliminate the remaining publicly held shares. Mesa admitted in
a supplemental proxy statement that the securities offered at the
"back end" of the merger would be subordinated to 2.4 billion dol-
lars of Mesa debt securities. 5'
Unocal's Board met for over nine hours to consider Mesa's
tender offer.5 2 Financial advisors and legal counsel made presenta-
tions evaluating the offer and discussed the Board's obligations
and available defense strategies, including a self-tender of Unocal's
shares. The eight outside Directors, with advisors, determined that
the offer was inadequate and should be rejected; this decision was
approved by the five present inside Directors. The Board ulti-
mately agreed to a self-tender of shares which would involve repur-
chase of 49% of Unocal's outstanding stock in exchange for debt
securities worth $72 per share, if Mesa purchased 64 million shares
of Unocal stock.53 The key feature of the self-tender offer was that
it excluded Mesa shareholders from tendering. The Board noted
that under the proration aspect of the exchange offer, every Mesa
share exchanged would displace one held by another shareholder,
defeating efforts to compensate adequately shareholders at the
"back end" of Mesa's proposal. Further, the Board determined
that the exclusion was necessary to prevent the exchange offer
from financing what it deemed to be Mesa's inadequate proposal. 4
The Delaware Supreme Court initially found that the Board had
the inherent power to manage corporate affairs and deal in its own
50. Id. Two-tiered tender offers have been described as follows:
The two-tiered tender offer is an attempt to purchase one hundred percent of
the target company that maximizes the coercion inherent in the tender offer pro-
cess. Instead of offering to buy all the target shares at a price X, the bidder offers
to buy fifty-one percent of the shares at price X + Y and announces its desire to
acquire the remainder in a second-step merger at price X-Y. Thus, the target's
shareholders are induced to tender both by carrot (premium offered in the first
stage) and by stick (the lower price offered in the second).
Note, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and Two-Tiered Takeovers: The Poison Pill
Preferred, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1964, 1966 (1984).
51. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 950 n.3.
52. Id. at 950.
53. Id. at 951.
54. Id.
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stock, and thus could repurchase its shares.15 By virtue of this au-
thority, Delaware corporate directors may deal selectively with
stockholders if their sole or primary purpose is not merely to re-
main in office.56 Further, the Board had the duty to protect the
corporation "from harm reasonably perceived, irrespective of its
source." 57 These considerations convinced the court that the Board
was not merely a passive instrumentality, and that it had the au-
thority to adopt the defensive self-tender.58
Citing Pogostin, the Delaware Supreme Court reiterated the
principle that the Business Judgment Rule is applicable in the
takeover context, and noted that the rule presumes that directors
make business decisions in the best interests of the company.59
Thus, "a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
board if the latter's decision can be attributed to any rational busi-
ness purpose," 0 and courts will not interfere with a board's deci-
sion unless it was not based on any rational business purpose.6'
However, the court recognized that a board might act primarily in
self-interest. Therefore, it imposed an "enhanced duty which calls
for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of
the business judgment rule may be conferred."6 2 Directors may
meet this burden "by showing good faith and reasonable investiga-
tion."63 Because Unocal's eight outside Directors agreed to oppose
Mesa's tender offer and to pursue the self-tender, the court held
that the Board had acted in good faith. Reasonable investigation
was shown by the Board's detailed analysis of the Mesa offer.6 "
The Unocal court introduced a balancing element in evaluating
defensive measures adopted by a board of directors. The court
noted that for defensive measures to fall within the ambit of the
Business Judgment Rule, they must "be reasonable in relation to
the threat posed."6 5 Thus, a board must inquire into the nature of
55. Id. at 953. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 14(a) (1983) provides that the business affairs of
all corporations shall be managed by the board of directors, while DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
160(a) (1983) allows a corporation extensively to buy, sell, or trade its own stock.
56. Id.; see Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964); Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d
405, 408 (Del. 1962).
57. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 955.
64. Id.
65. Id.
SELF- TENDER OFFERS
the takeover threat and its effect on the corporation. Relevant fac-
tors a board may consider include the price offered, timing of the
offer, the impact on "constituencies" other than shareholders (such
as employees and creditors), and the quality of securities offered in
exchange for the corporation's stock."e A board may also consider
whether stockholders who are short-term speculators fueled the co-
ercive tender offer at the expense of long term investors.6 7
Unocal's Board viewed the threat to the corporation as an inade-
quate two-tiered tender offer combined with the possibility of
greenmail. e8 The Board had determined that the company's shares
were worth more than the $54 offered at the front end of the
merger and also had concluded that the bonds offered at the back
end were "junk bonds" worth far less than $54. The supreme court
recognized this type of two-tiered tender offer as a classic method
of coercing stockholders into tendering their shares for fear of what
they will receive at the back end of the merger. Also, "the threat
was posed by a corporate raider with a national reputation as a
'greenmailer,'" which compounded the coerciveness of Mesa's
offer."e
Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court found valid the Board's ob-
jective either to defeat Mesa's inadequate offer or, if Mesa were to
prevail, provide the 49% of its stockholders, who would otherwise
have to accept "junk bonds," with $72 worth of senior debt. The
court held that Mesa shareholders should be excluded from the ex-
change offer because allowing Mesa to tender its shares would sub-
sidize Mesa's efforts to acquire the company, and because Mesa
could not fit within the class of shareholders being protected from
its own coercive tender offer. 70
Mesa argued that Unocal's discriminatory exchange offer was
unlawful. The court concurred with Mesa's position that no case
had ever sanctioned devices precluding a raider from sharing in
66. Id.
67. Legal scholars do not agree on whether shareholders benefit when a hostile tender
offer is defeated. Martin Lipton takes the position that shareholders do benefit from the
defeat of'a hostile tender offer. He supports his view with the fact that 95% of the cases in
which companies resisted tender offers have resulted in shareholders receiving a higher price
than the original offer. Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101,
106-09 (1979). Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 3, at 1188-90, take the position that share-
holders do not benefit when a hostile tender offer is rejected. They contend the most likely
reason a tender offer defeat results in a higher price is that it becomes the first round in an
extended auction for the company.
68. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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benefits available to all other shareholders. However, this case dif-
fered from cases approving selective stock repurchases only in
"that heretofore the approved transaction was the payment of
'greenmail' to a raider or dissident posing a threat to the corporate
enterprises. ' 71 Thus, the court implied that raiders should not
complain if they are excluded from obtaining benefits available to
other shareholders because greenmail allows them to obtain bene-
fits unavailable to those shareholders. The court found Mesa's
claim ironic, given its history of greenmail.72
The court also rejected Mesa's claim that Unocal's Board was
not disinterested since it received benefits from the tender of its
own shares which, because of the Mesa exclusion, did not devolve
upon all shareholders equally. Mesa's argument that the Board
had abdicated its fiduciary duties and punished Mesa for exercis-
ing its right of corporate democracy were similarly unpersuasive.
The court noted that Unocal's Board had reasonably found Mesa
to have exercised its rights contrary to the best interests of the
corporate enterprise, including Unocal's other stockholders, 7 and
that Delaware law does not require a corporation to guarantee ben-
efits to stockholders deliberately provoking the threats to which
the Board's actions were addressed.7
B. Implications of Unocal for Judicial Review of Corporate
Board Action
The Delaware Supreme Court noted in Unocal that a board
must fulfill an enhanced duty before the Business Judgment Rule
is invoked. This burden is satisfied by showing a board's good faith
and reasonable investigation. Earlier, in Aronson v. Lewis,75 the
Delaware Supreme Court had interpreted the Business Judgment
Rule as creating "a presumption that in making a business decision
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interest of the company. '77 To the extent that the standards of
board conduct delineated in Unocal and Aronson both require that
directors have acted in good faith, after reasonable investigation,
the enhanced duty requirement set forth in Unocal seems to pro-
71. Id. at 957.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 958.
74. Id.
75. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
76. Id. at 812 (emphasis added).
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vide shareholders with no protection beyond that of the Business
Judgment Rule as interpreted in Aronson."
However, Unocal added a balancing test to the court's arsenal of
review standards by requiring that a board's defensive measures
"be reasonable in relation to the threat posed" to the corpora-
tion.78 This balancing requirement provides an avenue of judicial
review through which a court may find that the defensive measures
were not reasonably related to the threat, and may preclude direc-
tors from adopting defensive measures when no threat exists, or
when the motives underlying the tactics are improper.
Finally, in upholding Unocal's discriminatory tender offer, the
court specifically referred to Mesa's reputation as a greenmailing
corporate raider. 79 This raises the question whether the court
would have upheld Unocal's defensive measure had a less well-
known corporate raider been excluded. The court might have con-
sidered less threatening a raider lacking Mesa's greenmailer repu-
tation and afforded Unocal's Board less discretion in adopting the
defensive measures.
After Unocal, Delaware corporate boards have substantial dis-
cretion in devising methods to defeat hostile tender offers. If the
measures satisfy the requirements of both the Business Judgment
Rule and the balancing element established in Unocal, they should
be upheld. The Unocal court, in effect, maintained a narrow scope
of judicial review of management's response to tender offers, de-
creasing Delaware corporate shareholders' chances of deciding
whether future tender offers should be accepted.
Courts should seriously consider Professor Gilson's suggestion
that shareholders be permitted to make the ultimate decisions re-
77. There may be a subtle distinction between the courts' approaches in Unocal and
Aronson. The Aronson approach requires that the presumption that directors acted on an
informed basis, in good faith, be rebutted by the party challenging the board's acts. The
Unocal approach seems to require directors to produce some evidence showing that they
acted in good faith after reasonable investigation. However, this distinction appears to be
minor and does not alter the conclusion that both approaches apply essentially the same
standard. The American Law Institute project also would require directors to act in good
faith on an informed basis before their actions are protected by the Business Judgment
Rule. It provides in pertinent part: "A director or officer who makes a business judgment in
good faith fulfills his duty under the Section if. . . (2) he is informed with respect to the
subject of his business judgment to the extent he reasonably believes to be appropriate
under the circumstances." PRINCIPALS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS 4.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1985).
78. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
79. Id. at 956.
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garding tender offers.80 Gilson views tender offers as the most via-
ble method of displacing incumbent management. He considers
mergers and sales of assets less effective because both require
board approval. Similarly, proxy challenges are not attractive be-
cause boards can use corporate funds to resist ouster. Thus, Gilson
advocates a court-imposed passive role for corporate management
in the takeover context; this approach would eliminate the prob-
lem of determining the proper scope of judicial review.81 However,
given that courts previously have upheld a variety of defensive tac-
tics, they may be reluctant to adopt this rather stringent standard.
Another way to ensure that shareholders make the ultimate de-
cisions involving tender offers is to require that the judiciary as-
sume a more active role in reviewing board-adopted defensive mea-
sures. Thus, the Business Judgment Rule should be replaced by
the fairness test, which would necessitate close judicial scrutiny of
management action. This standard would enable directors to op-
pose inadequate tender offers yet ensure that they acted in share-
holders' best interests.
IV. FEDERAL ISSUES
Federal issues regarding Unocal's discriminatory self-tender
were raised when Mesa filed suit in federal district court. Mesa
claimed that Unocal had violated federal securities law.
A. Federal District Court Decision in Unocal Corp. v. Pickens
Mesa challenged Unocal's discriminatory self-tender offer in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California,
claiming the discriminatory offer violated sections 13(e) and 14(e)
of the Williams Act.82 In Unocal Corp. v. Pickens,8 3 the court re-
80. Gilson, supra note 31, at 845-48.
81. Id. at 842-45; see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 3, at 1199-1201.
82. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, §§ 2, 3, 82 Stat. 454-55, 457 (amending 15 U.S.C. §
78m-n (1964)) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e), n(e) (1982)). The Williams Act
provides for:
full disclosure in cash tender offers and in stock acquisitions of more than 10 per-
cent of a corporation's equity shares. . . . [AIll pertinent facts concerning the
identity and background of the person or group making the tender offer or acqui-
sition must be disclosed. Stockholders must also be informed as to-[t]he size of
the holdings of the person or group involved[,] [tlhe source of the funds to be used
to acquire the shares . . .[,] [a]ny financing arrangements made for these funds
[.,] [tlhe purpose of the tender offer[,] [t]he plans of the offeror . . . whether
to liquidate [the company], sell its assets, merge it with another company, or to
make major changes in its business or corporate structure.
113 CONG. REC. 24,664 (1967).
83. 608 F. Supp. 1081 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
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jected this argument and denied Mesa's motion for a preliminary
injunction. In determining whether the Williams Act prohibits dis-
criminatory tender offers, the court recognized that the only stock-
holder excluded in this case was the "competing, hostile
tenderor." 4 The court then examined both the plain language and
the legislative history of the statute, and found nothing to support
Mesa's "implicitly sweeping reading of the [Williams] Act." 5
The court stated that the Securities and Exchange Commission's
(SEC) proposing but not adopting rules compelling tender offers to
be "open to all" was indicative of either their lack of authority to
so adopt, or nonadoption was a policy decision. 6 Subsequent to
this case, the SEC has adopted such rules8 7 dispelling the court's
presumptions although not eliminating possible court challenge.
The court's finding in Unocal that the Williams Act lacks a sub-
stantive "open to all" requirement is consistent with the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act in Schreiber v.
Burlington Northern, Inc.a8 The Court in Schreiber construed sec-
tion 14(e) of the Williams Act to require fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion or nondisclosure for its violation. It refused to read the term
"manipulative" into section 14(e) for fear of extending to federal
courts an invitation "to oversee the substantive fairness of tender
offers."8 9 In light of Schreiber, the Unocal decision correctly places
on state courts the burden of ensuring tender offer fairness.90
B. The SEC's Response to the Unocal Decisions
The SEC responded to the Unocal decisions by proposing rules
which would require tender offers to be open to all shareholders of
the class of securities subject to the tender offer." These rules, re-
cently adopted, make explicit the SEC's position that the Williams
Act contains "an implicit requirement for equal treatment of all
84. Id. at 1082.
85. Id.
86. Id.; see 44 Fed. Reg. 70,349 (1979) (proposed Rule 14e-4) (Dec. 11, 1979); 42 Fed.
Reg. 63,066 (proposed Rule 13e-4) (Dec. 7, 1977).
87. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4 (1986); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (1986).
88. 105 S. Ct. 2458 (1985).
89. Id. at 2464.
90. Unocal, 608 F. Supp. at 1082.
91. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4 (1986) (requiring issuer tender offers to be open to all security
holders of the class of securities subject to the offer); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (1986) (requir-
ing third-party tender offers to be open to all security holders of the class of security holders
of the class of securities subject to the offer).
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security holders." 92 Whether the SEC has the authority to adopt
these substantive positions is uncertain and probably will be chal-
lenged. In light of the Court's reluctance in Schreiber to impose
fairness standards on tender offers, the Court might strike these
measures as beyond the scope of the SEC's statutory authority and
as a substantial departure from the general full and adequate dis-
closure goals of the federal securities laws.9 3
The purpose of the Williams Act was "to require full and fair
disclosure for the benefit of investors. '94 Where Congress chose to
go beyond requiring mere disclosure, it explicity so provided in the
Act.9 5 Thus, absent clear statutory authority, the SEC should ei-
ther leave the fairness issue to state courts or obtain explicit con-
gressional approval of its position.
V. CONCLUSION
Delaware Supreme Court cases have generated a dynamic stan-
dard of judicial review for corporate board action in the takeover
context. Initially, corporate directors were required to justify their
purchases as primarily in the corporate interest. Later cases ap-
plied the Business Judgment Rule to board action, with the court
deferring to corporate judgment after an initial showing of the
board's good faith and reasonable investigation of the tender offer;
shareholders were required to demonstrate that directors' motives
in rejecting a tender offer were improper.
In Unocal, the court's initial requirement that directors show
good faith and reasonable investigation before the Business Judg-
ment Rule may be invoked appears to afford no additional assur-
ance that board actions will not be motivated by the desire to re-
tain corporate control. However, Unocal added a balancing
element which lays down objective factors that boards must con-
sider in adopting measures opposing tender offers. This examina-
tion could enable boards to adopt defensive measures reasonably
92. 51 Fed. Reg. 25873, 25877 (1986).
93. The Supreme Court noted this concern in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462, 478 (1977), describing the "fundamental purpose" of the Securities Exchange Act as
implementing a "philosophy of full disclosure"; "once full and fair disclosure has occurred,
the fairness of the terms of the transaction is at most a tangential concern of the statute."
94. 113 CONG. REc. 24,664 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
95. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, §§ 2, 3, 82 Stat. 454-55, 457 (amending 15 U.S.C. §
78m-n (1964)) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)-(e), n(d)-(f) (1982)). According to
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982), shares must be accepted pro rate when there is an oversub-
scription; 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1982) requires increased consideration to be paid for all
shares if it is paid for any prior to expiration of the terms of the offer.
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related to the threat posed and provide a means by which courts
can scrutinize board action for propriety.
Given the inherent conflict of interest that directors face in hos-
tile tender offers, the balancing requirement developed in Unocal
may not guarantee that shareholders' interests will be considered.
Thus, more stringent standards of judicial review may be neces-
sary. The fairness standard would enable courts to analyze board
decisions for basic fairness to corporate shareholders.
The SEC rules requiring that tender offers be open to all dictate
different results than those reached in the Unocal decisions. How-
ever, whether the SEC has the authority to adopt these substan-
tive rules, and whether such requirements exceed the general dis-
closure policy in federal securities markets is a justiciable matter.
David R. Singleton

